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Sexual harassment law has always struggled against the perception
that it is more a product of invention than intention. It is not just that the
law' protecting women (and men) in the workplace from discrimination
was intended as a poison pill when a few senators suggested its addition
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The real problem is that the law does
not contain the words "sexual harassment," and scholars argued for the
claim before courts got around to recognizing it.3 One thing is certain:
Congress hardly had hostile working environments (at least on the basis
of sex) 4 in mind when it passed the law that has produced more than
10,000 sexual harassment claims every year since 1992. 5
The words "disparate impact" appeared nowhere in the Civil Rights
Act (Title VII), either.6 But in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,7 the
Supreme Court recognized that even seemingly neutral acts (such as
posting hiring qualifications) can have negative, discriminatory
consequences.8 The Court concluded that federal common law was large
* Associate Professor of Law and Business, Illinois Wesleyan University,
Bloomington, Illinois.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2005) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1964).
2. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989) (discussing the
"somewhat bizarre path by which 'sex' came to be included as a forbidden criterion for
employment" and noting that the term was added to defeat the bill).
3. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 50-70 (1979) (proposing and discussing the hostile
environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
4. Arguably Congress had racially hostile working environments in mind, though
more likely its concern was garden-variety race discrimination.
5. See Sexual Harassment Charges, EEOC & FEPA's Combined: FY1992-FY2003,
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/lharass.html (last modified Jan. 27, 2005).
6. § 2000e-2.
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Id. at 431 (outlining the disparate impact case and noting that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
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enough to allow claims for such employer acts, 9 and years later Congress
caught up by at least implicitly recognizing the disparate impact claim.'0
But today that claim differs from sexual harassment law in one important
way: disparate impact theory, though nearly middle-aged, is mostly
unchanged from its original form," while sexual harassment theory, still
a teenager of sorts, 12 is the sort of self-sustaining and nuanced child that
reveals good parenting.
Though the laws of sexual harassment and disparate impact have
developed at different paces, they will likely always prompt the feeling
that they were unintended additions to the original employment law
discriminatory in operation").
9. The Court explained that the federal common law should track Congress' intent
in passing Title VII into law:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (making it an unlawful employment practice "to
limit.., employees.., in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's.., sex") (originally enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075).
11. That "original form" can be traced back to Griggs and, years later, Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank Trust Company. 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988) ("In certain cases,
facially neutral employment practices that have significant adverse effects on protected
groups have been held to violate the Act without proof that the employer adopted those
practices with a discriminatory intent.").
12. Sexual harassment law is a "teenager" if its birth is traced to Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986) ("Without question, when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
discriminate[s] on the basis of sex."). In fact, Meritor merely ratified a cause of action
(sexual harassment) that lower federal courts had recognized years earlier. See id. at 66
("Since the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 1980 Sexual Harassment]
Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created
a hostile or abusive work environment."). See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982) (comparing sexual harassment to unlawful racial harassment
and concluding that "[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive
environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality"); Katz. v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
254-55 (4th Cir. 1983). The EEOC's Guidelines officially defined sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2003). Courts had held hostile
work environments to be unlawful even before the EEOC issued its Guidelines. Within
the federal courts, Rogers v. EEOC "was apparently the first case to recognize a cause of
action based upon a discriminatory work environment." See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65
(citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)). Rogers, though, was a racial
harassment case.
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family. 13 On this score, though, sexual harassment law has become the
family favorite. Those who originally advocated for it14 have given way
to a new generation of scholars 15 who argue for its expansion even while
others (a smaller set) argue that it still does not belong. 16 More curious is
the family member these same scholars (and courts) have ignored. In the
family photo of employment laws, disparate impact theory now stands
anthropomorphically off to the side with an uneasy smile. Even though
the Supreme Court has allowed for its use in age discrimination cases, its
place in contemporary employment law is, at best, uncertain.'
7
But it need not be. Indeed, disparate impact theory and sexual
harassment law have more in common than their common law roots.
And if they could somehow be combined-or at least could be made to
work together-than it would result in two important accomplishments.
First, the combination might convince commentators and courts that
employment laws can be given their plain meaning and still mean
13. Judge Robert Bork believed that Congress "was not thinking of individual
[sexual] harassment at all but of discrimination in conditions of employment because of
gender." Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(Bork, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Judge Bork's dissent was joined by Kenneth Starr and then-Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia.
See also Richard A. Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 357 (1992) ("The early cases under Title VII did not regard sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination because acts of harassment did not reflect
official firm policy but were only the individual actions of company personnel exercised
for their own benefit."); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A
Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (arguing that "Congress
would have been quite surprised to learn that they had contemplated including sexual
harassment within the confines of sex discrimination--especially since the term 'sexual
harassment' did not come into currency until the late 1970s"). Similarly, there is much to
suggest that disparate impact theory was unenvisaged by Congress. See Richard A.
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REv. 493,
517 (2003) (noting that "an honest appraisal of the 1964 text and context of Title VII
could easily conclude that Congress did not intend to prohibit disparate impact
[discrimination] at all").
14. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 116-18.
15. See generally David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation
Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1784 (2002) (arguing for a
"sex per se" rule in which all sexual conduct is interpreted as "because of sex");
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691,
772 (1997) (arguing that "sexual harassment is sex discrimination precisely because its
use and effect police hetero-patriarchal gender norms in the workplace").
16. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1821 (1992) (arguing that workplace harassment laws violate First
Amendment principles and Supreme Court precedent).
17. Compare Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (Mar. 30, 2005) (allowing
for disparate impact claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act)
with Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1773 (dismissing disparate impact theory as a basis for
liability "not on the ascendancy in Title VII jurisprudence").
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plenty.1 8 That alone rules out the interpretive mischief which has taken
hold in the family of employment law scholars.' 9  Second, the
combination uses old (existing) law to breathe new life into workplace
protections.20  After all, if a textualist approach could result in greater
employee protections without turning judges into managers of employee
relations,21 then what could be the argument against it?
In truth, scholars certainly will marshal strong arguments against the
disparate impact hostile environment claim described here.22 The
evidence capable of proving the claim hardly seems self-evident.23 And
the standard of liability proposed below-one of deliberate
18. In general a "plain meaning" reading of statutes is the textualist's approach.
Textualism is not the same as literalism, which, though generally useful as a mode of
statutory interpretation and true to Congress' chosen words, is also capable of producing
strange-if not "[p]erverse and absurd"--statutory interpretations. See Twisdale v.
Snow, 325 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2003).
19. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1773 (arguing that all sexual conduct
should be interpreted as "because of sex"); see also Brian Lehman, Why Title VII Should
Prohibit All Workplace Sexual Harassment, 12 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 225 (2000)
(arguing that courts should prohibit all sexual harassment-even if the conduct is not
"because of" sex-simply because overinclusive rules are easier on courts than case-by-
case decision-making).
20. Title VII itself protects employees by constituting a "broad rule of workplace
equality." See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
21. In general, courts prefer not to oversee management decisions as superpersonnel
departments. Historically, the Seventh Circuit has been particularly reluctant to take on
such oversight. See, e.g., Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 678 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("a court must observe its limitations and 'not sit as a super-personnel
department that reexamines an entity's business decisions.., no matter how mistaken the
firm's managers') (quoting McCoy v. WGN Cont'l Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373
(7th Cir. 1992)).
22. See Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should
Non-Targeted Workplace Sexual Conduct Be Actionable Under Title VII?, 81 NEB. L.
REv. 1152, 1253 (2003) ("Arguing that non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace has
a disparate impact on women, however, reinforces the stereotype that sex and sexual
expression are bad for women, which has disadvantaged women in the past."). See also
Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods, Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 365 (4th Cir. 2002) (labeling as
"paternalistic" the dissent's notion that some language left women particularly vulnerable
and any notion that imagined "tender sensitivities of contemporary women"), vacated,
335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
23. Most disparate impact claims are grounded in evidence of statistical disparities
between a policy or practice's affect on the majority group and a protected class. "The
statute [Title VII] does not describe the degree of disparity needed to trigger disparate
impact liability." Primus, supra note 13, at 518. The Supreme Court has stated that
"rigid mathematical formula[s]" are not helpful in determining a disparate (or
disproportionate) impact of an employment practice or policy on a protected group, but
that evidence rooted in statistics must indicate disparities "sufficiently substantial" to
raise an inference of causation. Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995
(1988). The EEOC has adopted a rule under which an adverse impact is not ordinarily
inferred unless the members of a particular group are selected at a rate that is less than
four-fifths of the rate at which the group with the highest rate is selected. See EEOC's
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2005).
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indifference-is generous to defendants when compared to the
negligence standard used in intentional discrimination (disparate
treatment) cases.24 But decades have passed without litigants taking
advantage of the claim. If additional time would result in refinement,
there should be no hurry.
The purpose of this paper is to establish that an unintended hostile
environment---one not caused or motivated by a victim's protected class
but nevertheless uniquely injurious to members of that class-is
unlawful.15 As set out below, the claim already exists. 26 Less certain is
the claim's applicability to the modem workplace,2 7 and the basis for an
employer's liability under the claim. 8 This paper advocates for a
"deliberate indifference" standard and explains that the standard creates
the best incentives under the law. 29  The paper also illustrates that
liability under the "deliberate indifference" standard is limited.30  The
result-a disparate impact hostile environment claim-makes the best
possible use of existing law. Disparate impact theory is given a new
purpose and with it a new relevance to the employment law family. The
family itself matures without multiplying. And two Title VII children-
sexual harassment law and disparate impact theory-unparented by the
original law and adopted years later, prove how worthy common law can
be created by combination.
II. Sexual Harassment as a Form of Disparate Impact, Not Disparate
Treatment, Theory
In truth disparate treatment theory has always been an awkward
home for the typical hostile environment harassment claim. Take the
environment where male workers openly exchange pornographic
materials and talk about sex acts.3 ' We can assume that the conduct is
24. See, e.g., Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Even
after the advent of the affirmative defense outlined in [Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)], the
negligence standard still applies to sexual harassment by coworkers."); Courtney v.
Landair Transp. Inc., 227 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2000) ('The victim of coworker sexual
harassment must therefore prove negligence by the employer."); Perry v. Harris Chernin,
Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the "law of the circuit" in
coworker harassment cases is negligence, not strict liability).
25. Disparate impact theory is based on evidence of unique injury. After all, if the
injuries caused by an employment practice were evenly distributed over protected classes,
there would be no basis for a disparate impact claim.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See id.
30. See infra Part V.
31. As one federal court of appeals has noted, this is not uncommon:
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severe and pervasive-in other words, it is the type of "hellish"
environment that ordinarily might rise to the level of an actionable
claim.32  And assume that from a female employee's perspective the
sexualized atmosphere is unwelcome33 and unavoidable.34 Does this
describe an actionable claim? Only if a court could also conclude that
the bad actors in the workplace had changed the female employee's
working environment because of her sex. (Evidence that they are equal
opportunity harassers,35 or that they had always acted sexually in the
workplace,36 would doom the claim.)
The "because of sex" standard comes directly from the statute
itself,37 and while the words could not appear more unambiguous, they
mean less with every passing year. Historically, the words mean that the
employee's workplace was changed "on account of' or "by reason of'
her sex. 38 Put another way, a similarly situated man would not have
experienced the same environment. 39 That describes a typical disparate
Most unfortunately, expressions such as "fuck me," "kiss my ass," and "suck
my dick," are commonplace in certain circles, and more often than not, when
these expressions are used (particularly when uttered by men speaking to other
men), their use has no connection whatsoever with the sexual acts to which
they make reference--even when they are accompanied, as they sometimes
were here, with a crotch-grabbing gesture. Ordinarily, they are simply
expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation.
Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 127 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997).
32. "The workplace that is actionable is the one that is 'hellish."' Perry v. Harris
Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l
Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430, (7th Cir. 1995)).
33. "The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome."' Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986)
(explaining that acts may be unwelcome and yet performed voluntarily by victim of
harassment).
34. Vulgar or profane speech is often unavoidable in the workplace because workers
are "captive," in the sense that they are not free to leave. See Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.
v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1141 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of writ of
certiorari) ("[We] have occasionally stated that speech may be more readily restricted
when the audience is 'captive' and cannot avoid the objectionable speech.").
35. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F. 3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that is
not "anomalous for a Title VII remedy to be precluded when both sexes are treated
badly" because "Title VII is predicated on discrimination").
36. See, e.g., Ocheltree, 308 F.3d at 359, vacated, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) ("[T]he uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that the men engaged in the same
type of behavior before Ocheltree began working at Scollon Productions.").
37. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination "because of...
[an] individual's. . . sex" (or race, color, religion, or national origin). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (2005).
38. That describes the typical dictionary definition of the term "because of." See
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1993). See also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) ("The critical inquiry, the one
commanded by the words of [the statute], is whether gender was a factor in the
employment decision at the moment it was made. ") (emphasis in original).
39. Evidence that a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably is crucial
[Vol. I110: 1
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treatment claim, which is defined as intentional discrimination.4° In
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,41 the United States Supreme Court
defined sexual harassment in disparate treatment terms.4 2 And while it
was several years after Meritor before the Court reviewed another sexual
harassment claim in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,43 the Court clearly
favored the same disparate treatment formula for harassment cases.
44
The federal courts of appeals have followed suit by distinguishing
between cases prompted by the plaintiffs sex and cases merely
containing bad conduct.45 Where the bad actor's intent is personal, not
discriminatory, these courts have not hesitated to throw the claims out in
their entirety.46
Formulating sexual harassment as an intentional discrimination
to the plaintiff's case. "If a district court determines that a plaintiff has failed to identify
a similarly situated co-worker outside of her protected class, or that the co-worker
identified by the plaintiff, while similarly situated, was not treated in a more favorable
manner, it need not address any of the underlying allegations of disparate treatment."
Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F. 3d 319, 331 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding that an
employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to contribute more money into a
fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of them is a woman, rather than a
man, "does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows 'treatment of a person
in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different."') (quoting Developments
in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1170 (1971)).
40. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 ("In saying that gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at
the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response,
one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.").
41. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
42. Id. at 64 (stating that Title VII "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment") (internal
citation omitted).
43. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
44. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor's language and adding that in a sexual harassment
case, the unlawful "disparate treatment of men and women in employment.., includes
requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment").
45. Compare La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 490 (5th Cir. 2002)
(reversing summary judgment in same-sex harassment case where evidence suggested
harasser may have been homosexual and interested in plaintiff) with Hamm v.
Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming
summary judgment in same-sex harassment case where the incidents directed at plaintiff
implied he was either a poor performer or gay).
46. See Davis v. Coastal Int'l Sec. Agency, 275 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(determining that vulgarity exchanged between two male coworkers involved "a gross
workplace dispute" and not one consisting of unlawful sex discrimination); Lack v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that comments
directed at the plaintiff were sexual, but not uttered because of the plaintiff's sex);
Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining that vulgarity
described by plaintiff, such as "suck my dick," were profane but not prompted by
plaintiff's sex).
2005]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
claim makes sense for other reasons, too. The claim does not exist, at
least textually, in the statute that gave birth to it,47 which is why Meritor
defined it as a subset of garden-variety sex discrimination.4 8 Under that
approach, it would be possible to commit sex discrimination without
sexually harassing someone, but it would not be possible to commit
actionable sexual harassment unless the conduct also could be labeled
sex discrimination.49
But if sexual harassment is both textually and logically an example
of intentional discrimination, then how could it be redefined as large
enough to also include a disparate impact claim? In other words, how
could an employee like Lisa Ocheltree, who worked at a small company
making game mascots in South Carolina,50 avoid the argument that the
men around did not target her with sexuality and simulated acts of oral
sex because she was a woman, but rather because she was new to the
workplace? 5' She could avoid the argument if she could convince a
court to interpret "because of sex" differently from the way courts
typically have defined the term. 52 She could argue that though the statute
is written in the active voice, it allows for a passive voice interpretation.
It would go like this: my coworkers did not target me "because of' my
sex, but I (perhaps because of my femaleness) experienced a hostile
environment precisely "because of' it. 53 In disparate impact terms, the
words and conduct impacted me differently because of my sex.
54
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2005).
48. "In sum, we hold that a claim of 'hostile environment' sex discrimination is
actionable under Title VII." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
49. This conclusion follows from the Court's decision to term the cause of action
"hostile environment sex discrimination," id., and from the Court's holding that a hostile
environment is actionable because it is caused by sex discrimination. See id. at 66 ("a
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment").
50. See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods, Inc., 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated, 335
F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For simplicity, the original Fourth Circuit decision
found at 308 F.3d 351 will be referred to as Ocheltree I and the en banc decision found at
335 F.3d 325 will be referred to as Ocheltree II.
51. In a nutshell, this fairly summarizes the Ocheltree case, which is discussed in
detail in Part III, infra.
52. See, e.g., Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 375 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("I believe,
however, that the 'because of sex' requirement allows for more interpretive flexibility
than the majority recognizes."), vacated, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
53. See Franke, supra note 15, at 772 ("The wrong of sexual harassment must
consist of something more than that the conduct would not have occurred 'but for' the
sex of the target .... [S]exual harassment is sex discrimination precisely because its use
and effect police hetero-patriarchal gender norms in the workplace.").
54. See Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 376 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is an...
obvious sense in which women in an atmosphere saturated with remarks demeaning to
women are 'exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed' precisely because the language heard by both
women and men is more demeaning to women than to men.").
[Vol. I110: 1
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A court might well buy that argument for two reasons. The first is
that the Supreme Court, whether or not it has not done so intentionally,
has left the door wide open for the argument to be made. In a little-
noticed (at the time) concurrence to the Harris v. Forklift Systems55 case,
Justice Ginsburg defined sexual harassment with broad, motivation-
neutral language: "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. 56
Lost on most lawyers and, indeed, scholars, is that Justice Ginsburg's
formulation of the "critical issue" leaves out any evidence of intent,
making it little different from the case where an employer unnecessarily
requires a high school diploma (in the historical race case57), and thus
little different from a disparate impact case. 8
In the federal courts, and especially at the Supreme Court level,
Justice Ginsburg's generous formula lay dormant until the Court
repeated and embraced it in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.59 The issue in Oncale was whether men could claim to be sexually
harassed by other men (or women by other women).60 The unanimous
answer was a statutory no-brainer, as Title VII contains no such limiting
terms.6 1 Even the Court's succinct opinion appears to suggest curiosity
with the hand-wringing lower courts and scholars brought to the same-
sex harassment debate for years.62 But sometimes succinctness invites
mischief. In what itself is an interesting curiosity, Oncale's author and
well-known textualist, 63 Justice Scalia, quoted Justice Ginsburg's
formula without making any attempt 64 to note that a sex-based difference
in workplace conditions does not necessarily suggest unlawfulness
(because it does not establish the reasons behind the difference).
The important point is that while on its face Oncale professed to
answer the simple question (concerning the unlawfulness of same-sex
55. 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993).
56. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
57. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
58. After all, Griggs was, in fact, a disparate impact case.
59. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
60. Id. at 76.
61. As the Court explained, "[w]e see no justification in the statutory language or
our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the
coverage of Title VII." Id. at 79.
62. The Court referred to the lower courts' decisions on the same-sex harassment
issue as reflecting "a bewildering variety of stances." Id.
63. Justice Scalia's textualism in the Title VII context is reflected in his preference
to use the term "sex" rather than "gender." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
157 n. I (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's interchangeable usage of the
terms "sex" and "gender").
64. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
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harassment), its embrace of Justice Ginsburg's formula unwittingly
unloosed the disparate impact hostile environment claim.65  After all,
women (for example) may be subjected to "disadvantageous conditions"
for many reasons (such as their sensibility) whether or not the bad actors
behind the harassment intended it that way. So Justice Ginsburg's
formula does much more than replaces a finding of intent with a
reasonable proxy (an inequality of workplace conditions). Rather, it
removes the finding of intent entirely from the sexual harassment
claim.66
At first blush removing the issue of intent from sexual harassment
cases may appear absurd. After all, Oncale itself underscored the
importance of motivation, or intent, in discrimination cases. 67 Courts,
too, have routinely reminded plaintiffs that they do not sit as super-
personnel departments in discrimination cases, meaning their role is not
to undo unfair decisions, or those made mistakenly or even baselessly,
unless the decisions were tainted by a discriminatory motive.68  The
"critical inquiry" in disparate treatment cases is the real reason behind
the employer's decision,69 and if the employer honestly believed in its
(nondiscriminatory) reason,70 then it is legally off the hook.71  A silly
65. It should be no surprise that Judge Michael, the dissenter in Ocheltree I, found
Justice Ginsburg's formula to support his argument that Ocheltree had a viable disparate
impact claim. Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 375-76 (arguing that his belief that Title VII's
"because of sex" language allows for "interpretive flexibility" is "inherent" in Justice
Ginsburg's formulation). Judge Michael concedes that both men and women at Scollon
were exposed to vulgar and profane language. "Yet there is an equally obvious sense in
which women in an atmosphere saturated with remarks demeaning to women are
'exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed' precisely because the language heard by both women and men
is more demeaning to women than to men." Id. at 376.
66. For Judge Michael, "workplace comments portraying women as sexually
subordinate to men qualify as harassment 'because of sex"' even absent any evidence of
intent. Id.
67. Oncale allowed that in a same-sex (female) context, "[a] trier of fact might
reasonably find... discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such
sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser
is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Oncale,
523 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Courts
refuse to sit in judgment as super-personnel departments overseeing corporate decisions,
even if some judges think the decisions to be mistaken or perplexing or silly."). See also
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (explaining that Title VII's
prohibitory language "describes only one aspect" of the statute and that "Itihe other
important aspect of the statute is its preservation of an employer's remaining freedom of
choice").
69. In the words of the Supreme Court, the reason the employer would give "at the
moment of the [employment] decision," assuming a truthful response. See id. at 250.
70. See Brill, 119 F.3d at 1271 (explaining that "[t]he question is not whether Brill
[the plaintiff] actually referred to a client as an 'idiot' and suggested that he be shot; what
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decision made in good faith dooms the theory that the same decision was
made because of someone's sex (or race, and so on).72 But if Oncale
should not be read as a full-scale reversal of years of intent-laden
harassment cases, then how should it be read? Simple: as directing
lawyers and scholars to a claim that the Court embraced years earlier in
Griggs v. Duke Power:73 the disparate impact claim.
Combining disparate impact and sexual harassment theory should
not be awkward in the least. Courts have never questioned applying
disparate impact theory to the general sex discrimination case, and at
times have even suggested it when parties have not. Take the issue of
bathroom facilities for blue-collar workers. Eileen Lynch worked as a
carpenter apprentice for the Tennessee Valley Authority.74 Audrey Jo
DeClue worked as the only female linesman for the Central Illinois Light
75 76Company.75 Lynch had no sanitary portable bathroom to use. The lack
of a toilet caused her urinary track infections and tremendous
discomfort.77 But she still had it better than DeClue, who had no
portable bathroom to use at all 78 and whose employer suggested that she
relieve herself in the open (by the side of the road) just like her male
counterparts did. 79 A federal appellate court affirmed the dismissal of
DeClue's hostile environment claim, 80 while a different federal appellate
court sided with Lynch.8' The difference? Lynch's attorney sued her
employer under disparate impact theory,82 while, to the frustration of the
DeClue court, her attorney did not.
83
is important is Lante's honest belief that she said those things").
71. See, e.g., id.; see also Kariotis v. Navistar, 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1997)
(affirming summary judgment in case where court criticized employer's investigation of
employee while she was off-duty but nevertheless held that the "honest belief' rule
doomed plaintiff's case).
72. "In other words, arguing about the accuracy of the employer's assessment is a
distraction, because the question is not whether the employer's reasons for a decision are
'right but whether the employer's description of its reasons is honest."' Sweeney v.
West, 149 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
73. 401 U.S. at 429-30. As the Supreme Court explained in Griggs, "practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices." Id.
74. See Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 381 (6th Cir. 1987).
75. See DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2000).
76. Lynch, 817 F.2dat 381-82.
77. Id.
78. DeClue, 223 F.3d at 436.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 437.
81. Lynch, 817 F.2d at 389.
82. Id. at 383.
83. DeClue, 223 F.3d at 437 ("But this case has not been litigated as a disparate-
impact case.").
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The lesson from the Lynch and DeClue cases is that, under the right
circumstances, seemingly neutral workplace conditions (in DeClue, the
lack of a bathroom for any employee, whether male or female) are
unlawful if they disadvantage one sex in a way they do not disadvantage
the other.84 That sounds like Justice Ginsburg's Title VII formula in
Harris, 85 a sexual harassment case. 86 If the standard to be used by courts
in sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases is the same, then it
should be no surprise that the disparate impact claim allowed in Lynch
and invited by the court in DeClue is the same claim these employees
would use if they claimed sexual harassment. Rather than contesting
their workplace's sanitariness,87 they would be questioning its sexuality.
In neither case would they have to prove that their sex (here, female)
prompted or caused their treatment, or that their employers intended
them to suffer. The disparate impact claim-as reflected in Justice
Ginsburg's formulation-is untethered by the statute's "because of sex"
mooring and, in turn, is relieved of that evidentiary burden.88
The bottom line is that while disparate impact theory traditionally
has not been used in sexual harassment cases, that reflects a convention
rather than a rule. Indeed, having created the disparate impact claim
through federal common law89 (though Congress has since written it into
the statute), 90 courts would be hard-pressed to now limit its application to
84. See Lynch, 817 F.2d at 389 (explaining that "[w]hen it is shown that employment
practices place a heavier burden on minority employees than on members of the majority,
and this burden relates to characteristics which identify them as members of the protected
group, the requirements of a Title VII disparate impact case are satisfied").
85. 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
86. The president of Harris' company often insulted her because of her sex and made
her the target of unwelcome sexual innuendoes. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. At one point he
suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise." Id.
On other occasions he asked Harris and her female coworkers to get coins from his front
pants pocket. Id.
87. The Lynch court found that Title VII's language "is clearly broad enough to
include working conditions that have an adverse impact on a protected group of
employees." Lynch, 817 F.2d at 387. The court noted that unsanitary toilets limited
female employees "in a way that adversely affected their status as employees based
solely on their sex." Id.
88. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (in a disparate impact case a court is concerned with
"the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation"). Of course,
there is no reason that a plaintiff could not bring both disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims against her employer. Eileen Lynch did just that. Lynch, 817 F.2d at 380.
The trial court treated her claims separately and rejected them both. Id. The Sixth
Circuit rejected Lynch's appeal of the trial court's decision on her disparate treatment
claim. See id. at 386.
89. Technically, in allowing for the disparate impact claim, the Supreme Court
interpreted-not added to-Title VII's terms. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; see also
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982).
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (making it an unlawful employment practice "to
limit.., employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
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only certain kinds of discrimination cases. Sexual harassment-it, too, a
common law creation-is unlawful not as a separate form of
discrimination, but a subset of sex discrimination. 9' If in other cases
plaintiffs can prove sex discrimination by relying on disparate impact
theory,92 then it would truly be odd to say that only one set of plaintiffs-
those claiming harassment-cannot do the same. Indeed, it would be
more than odd. It would be illogical, too.
93
III. How the Disparate Impact Hostile Environment Fits the Modem
Workplace
To be clear, the argument made here is not that the disparate impact
sexual harassment claim is an advance in the law, nor that it is necessary
to reflect the realities of the modem workplace. Rather, the argument
here is that the claim logically and textually already exists in the law.
Does that mean that judges and juries should expect to see a flurry of
disparate impact hostile environment claims?
The honest answer is maybe as many frivolous claims are already
brought under Title VII. Take the case of Diane Leibovitz, who worked
as a supervisor for the New York City Transit Authority.94 Leibovitz's
job was to make sure subway cars were repaired properly. 95 She also
supervised subway car cleaners.96 In September 1993, Leibovitz learned
from a car inspector that a female car cleaner was being sexually
harassed by her male supervisor.97 The inspector also told Leibovitz that
another car cleaner-a female employee who had previously complained
to Leibovitz about the same supervisor-had been transferred to another
shop closer to her home. 98 According to the inspector, as relayed to
Leibovitz, the supervisor engaged in a pattern of harassing women by
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's ... sex"). Passed as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
91. See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
92. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (determining that
district court was not wrong "in holding that [Alabama's] statutory height and weight
standards [for correctional officers] had a discriminatory impact on women applicants").
93. Here I am appealing to the same logic that the Supreme Court correctly applied
in Oncale in determining that same-sex harassment was unlawful under Title VII. See
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (finding no justification in "the statutory language" for a
"categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims").
94. See Leibovitz v. New York City Trans. Authority, 252 F.3d 179, 182 (2d Cir.
2001).
95. See id.
96. See Leibovitz v. New York City Trans. Authority, 4 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D.N.Y.
1998), rev'd, 252 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001). The Leibovitz district and federal appellate
court opinions will hereinafter be referred to as Leibovitz I and Leibovitz II, respectively.
97. Leibovitz II, 252 F.3d at 182.
98. Id.
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making remarks, touching them and "coming on to them." 99
Leibovitz is short on facts but long on law,100 as the district court not
only found that Leibovitz had standing to bring her claim, 1 1 but also that
she had pointed to enough evidence to send her hostile environment
harassment to a jury. 0 2 That jury found in her favor and awarded her
$60,000 because the Transit Authority had "violate[d] ... Leibovitz's
rights by its deliberate indifference to widespread discriminatory
practices and sexual misconduct against others."' 1 3 Without drawing a
direct comparison, the court invoked the horrors inflicted in Nazi
concentration camps and in the Soviet gulag to argue that injuries
observed-even if not experienced first-hand-should be
compensable. 0 4  "Does the law deny that an environment where a
superior refers to co-workers in vulgar sexual terms, while studiously
avoiding calling one favored female profane names, is demeaning,
harassing, and incompatible with the dignity and well-being of all the
women in the workplace?"'' 0 5 The court answered its own question, and
did so in large terms: "The deterioration of the humanity, spirit, and
dignity of a member of an abused class, granted personal immunity on
her promise that she will remain silent-perhaps even that she will turn
away and not see what is plain to see-is impermissible under
fundamental ethics and law.',
10 6
The problem with the district court's law is that Leibovitz was not
asked to turn a blind eye to the abuse others experienced. She was not
granted "personal immunity" in order to buy her silence. In fact, she did
complain-many times and to many different people (though one
manager suggested that her complaints could be detrimental to her
career). 10 7 In fact, her claim for damages related to a "major depressive
order" she developed "from her frustrated attempts to secure a remedy
for the women alleging harassment."'' 0 8 So she was not silent, nor asked
to be. The other problem with the district court's sweeping and
provocative analogy to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Gulag is simple:
unlike the "rare Jewish person in a Nazi concentration camp afforded
99. Id.
100. See id. at 182-83.
101. Leibovitz I, 4 Supp. 2d at 150 ("Plaintiff suffered emotional trauma ... directly
traceable to the sexually harassing environment in her workplace.").
102. Id. at 152 (finding "sufficient evidence of widespread gender-based harassment
for the jury to find a hostile work environment").
103. Id. at 146.
104. Id. at 152.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 147.
108. Leibovitz II, 252 F.3d at 182.
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privileged treatment,"' 10 9 Leibovitz did not work alongside the women
who claimed to have been harassed. 10 She did not witness any of the
incidents of harassment."' More than this: she conceded that she was
unaware of the harassment when it was occurring. 112 So her claim is
closer to someone who visits a battlefield after the battle has concluded
and perhaps even after the casualties have been removed. She can sense
the horrors that transpired, but so could anyone-so should anyone-
visiting the same scene. In that case she is upset not because she is a
woman (after all, sexual harassment is sex discrimination), but because
she could do so little for those injured.
In reversing the jury verdict (and the district court's decision
upholding it"13), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said an
employee like Leibovitz was not injured in the way the law
contemplated.1 14 The court concluded that a working environment at the
Transit Authority may have been hostile (and actionable), but that if such
a working environment existed, Leibovitz did not see it and certainly did
not have to work in it. 1 5 The court reminded her that she was not a
target of the harassment, was not present when it occurred, and did not
even know about it until long after the fact." 16 In a nutshell, her case was
closer to an individual aware of harassment "going on in a nearby office
of another firm" or perhaps reported in a newspaper article. 17 While the
appeals court agreed with the district court that so-called second-hand
harassment (harassment not targeted at the plaintiff) could be relevant to
a plaintiffs hostile environment case, 1 8 it corrected the district court by
noting that in that case the harassment might have limited probative
value.11
9
Leibovitz does not describe a disparate treatment case. As the
appeals court concluded, no one targeted Leibovitz because of her sex or
even exposed her to hurtful working conditions because she was a
woman. 120  But rather than leaving it at that, the Court of Appeals
(unnecessarily) added one tantalizing sentence at the close of its opinion:
109. See Leibovitz 1, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
110. Leibovitz II, 252 F.3d at 183.
111. At oral argument before the federal appeals court, Leibovitz's attorney conceded
that her injury rested solely on the alleged harassment of other women out of her
presence. Id.
112. See id.
113. See Leibovitz I, 4 F. Supp. 2d 144.




118. See id. at 190.
119. Id.
120. See Leibovitz II, 252 F.3d at 189.
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"We do not consider whether, as the District of Columbia Circuit has
suggested in dicta, 'a woman who was never herself the object of
harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an
atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive.'' 1 21  For that
closing shot the court quoted Vinson v. Taylor,122 which, of course,
landed in the Supreme Court's lap under the name Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson.123 Meritor was a clear-cut disparate treatment case and the
Supreme Court did not make (and never has made) the same suggestion
that the Court of Appeals suggested at the close of Leibovitz. Sixteen
years after Meritor gave birth to the harassment claim (at the Supreme
Court level), the Leibovitz court turned back the clock and opened the
door its dramatic enlargement. In other words, this is one court that
would at least entertain the disparate impact argument made in a hostile
environment case.
And why not? Say that Leibovitz worked alongside the women
who had been harassed. Say also that the sexuality hurled at the women
(but not Leibovitz) was profane and vulgar (in other words, offensive
under any reasonable test). If "because of sex" implies intent and
motivation (as the Supreme Court has said it does), 124 then her claim
could not be a disparate treatment one. The harassers did not target her
because of her sex; indeed, they did not target her at all. Her claim in
that case would be purely environmental, as in "my working conditions
were adversely impacted because I am a woman and the words and
profanity affected me because of my sex.' ' 125 Indeed, it might even be
unnecessary to show that the employees targeted in that case objected to
the treatment or took offense. A black employee surrounded by the
pervasive use of the term "nigger" might have a claim that the term
horrifically (and unlawfully) changed his working environment whether
or not the term was directed at him' 26-or even used by his black
121. Id. at 190.
122. 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
123. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
124. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
125. But see Leibovitz II, 252 F.3d at 189-90 (characterizing Leibovitz's environment
as hostile "by expanding the concept of environment to include venues in which she did
not work" is not the answer because it would "open the door to limitless employer
liability, and allow a recovery by any employee made distraught by office gossip, rumor
or innuendo").
126. Compare Rodgers v. W.S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993)
("Perhaps no single act can more quickly 'alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment' than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as
'nigger' by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.") (citing Bailey v. Binyon,
583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("The use of the word 'nigger' automatically
separates the person addressed from every non-black person; this is discrimination per
se."'), with Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 552 n.14 (7th Cir.
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coworkers (as sometimes the term is used).
127
The problem with Leibovitz's case is that she was at least two steps
removed from the harassment she complained about. The harassing
parties did not target her. Nor did she even witness it. In truth, she set
out to uncover the harassment and became an intra-organizational
whistle-blower on behalf of the women subjected to it. 128  The
unintended hostile environment claim comes closer to what Amaani Lyle
experienced behind the "Friends" set.129 The executive producers of the
hugely popular television series hired Lyle as a "writer's assistant."'
130
Her job was to sit in on lengthy writers' meetings and take copious notes
(she got the job because she claimed to type fast).131 Her notes freed the
writers from the same task and enabled them to focus on writing dialogue
for the show's characters.
132
Lyle may have recorded some jokes, but what she remembered most
was being forced to listen (and transcribe) hours of sexual profanity.
133
One writer spoke often about his oral sex experiences and his sexual
fantasies involving female actors on the show. 1 4  He constantly
sketched-and circulated-profane pictures of female cheerleaders
during the writers' meetings.' 35 Two writers debated whether one of
them could have "fucked" one of the female actors but had missed his
chance. 136  The same two often referred to the alleged infertility of
another female actor on the show and joked about her having "dried
branches in her vagina" and a "dried up pussy.' ' 137 Lyle witnessed one
writer pretending to masturbate while sitting at his desk138; the same
writer often walked around during the meeting while gesturing as if he
2002) (noting that in the case before it the use of the word "nigger," while "highly
offensive" was made only once, was made by a coworker and not a supervisor, and
management suspended the employee involved).
127. See Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for
Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1553 (1996) ("Blacks also debate the
resurgent appropriation of the word 'nigger' within their community. While some
maintain that the co-option of this term can be empowering, others mourn the
reemergence of the word and its hateful connotation.").
128. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117.
129. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004), petition for review granted, 2004 WL 1718071 (Cal. July 21, 2004).
130. Id. at512-13.
131. Id. at 513.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 515.
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were masturbating. 39 During his deposition, a writer conceded that he
and the others would often tell "blowjob stories" in the writers' room
during their meetings. 140  They also openly discussed personal
experiences with anal sex. 141
It is a wonder they ever found the time to make the show funny.
Lyle, who is African-American, did her job and transcribed what she
heard. In fact, she was not free to leave the meetings. 42 The writers
wanted her there at all times because they "never knew when something
was going to pop up., 1 43  Lyle sued the show's producer, Warner
Brothers, for sexual harassment (and also race discrimination) under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),' 44 which tracks
the language used by Congress when it drafted Title VII and proscribed
discrimination "because of' sex.1 45 (FEHA actually goes a bit farther
than the federal law by explicitly proscribing harassment "because of'
sex). 146
Not even Lyle argued that the writers targeted her because she was a
woman, or that they took pleasure using profanity around her because of
her sex, or that they used sexual vulgarity to relegate her to outsider
status during the meetings. In other words, her case lacked any evidence
that the writers set out to intentionally harass her, or to change her
working conditions because she was a woman. 47 In fact, the writers
claimed that they needed to be vulgar and profane because it was
necessary creatively-the vulgarity sparked story lines, which often
touched upon sexuality and sexual innuendo (and even infertility).
148
The trial court never tackled the writers' defense. 49 The court found
Lyle's case to be largely time-barred and entirely frivolous-so frivolous
that in addition to ordering her to pay over $20,000 in court costs, it
ordered her to pay $415,800 to the defendants for their attorneys' fees.15
0
Plaintiffs often lose discrimination cases, which is why more than
90% of them are resolved before trial.' 51 Many are frivolous, or, more
generously, brought by lawyers who misunderstand the high hurdle they
139. Id.
140. Id. at 517.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 518, 520.
143. Id. at 520.
144. CAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 12900 et seq. (West 1992).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
146. CAL. GoVT. CODE ANN. § 12940(h) (West 1992).
147. Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 515.
148. Id. at 519-20.
149. Id. at 514.
150. Id.
151. See Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997).
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must clear under federal and state discrimination laws. 1 52 But it is the
rare plaintiff who not only loses her case but who also must pay the fees
incurred by her employer in defending against her suit. No matter. In
Lyle's case, a California Court of Appeal saw to it that the extraordinary
order to pay fees was short-lived. 153 In fact, the court found merit in the
same case the trial court had labeled "unreasonable and without
foundation."' 154 The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's summary
judgment against Lyle on her sexual harassment claim.
155
The California Court of Appeal did not claim that the writers had
targeted Lyle or that she could prove intentional discrimination (the
disparate treatment case). But neither did it concede that such evidence
was necessary:
Defendants contend in order for Lyle to establish the harassment she
complains about was 'based on sex' she must be able to show the
allegedly harassing conduct was directed at her personally. Not so.
A woman may be the victim of sexual harassment if she is forced to
work in an atmosphere of hostility or degradation of her gender. 1
56
The court sought to "clarify the 'based on sex' element of a harassment
cause of action" 157 by ruling out any requirement that a plaintiff be a
"direct victim"'5 8 of harassment, so long as the harassing conditions
"disrupt[ed] her emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect[ed] her
ability to perform her job as usual, or otherwise interfere[d] with and
undermine[d] her personal sense of well-being."' 59 In that case, the court
allowed that the employee minimally must witness the harassment,
which means it must take place in "her immediate work environment."'
60
The appellate decision in Lyle is unfortunate both for the law that it
distorts (disparate treatment) and the law that it neglects (disparate
impact). The work of some scholars to the contrary 161 (and to be fair,
some judges), 62 intent matters in disparate treatment cases because intent
comes closest to the words that Congress used (the same words-
"because of... sex"-used by the California legislature in enacting
152. See id.
153. Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 515.
154. See id. at 514.
155. Id. at 517.
156. Id. at 514.
157. Id. at 515.
158. Id.
159. Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 514-15.
160. Id. at 515.
161. See Franke and Schwartz, supra note 15.
162. See Doe v. City of Belleview, 119 F.3d 563, 593 (7th Cir. 1997) (questioning
"whether it makes a whit of difference why [the plaintiff] was singled out for abuse"
considering the fact that his genitals were grabbed to determine his gender and a
coworker regularly threatened to sexually assault him).
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FEHA). 163 "Because of' means something less than intent and motive
only when courts mutate or misquote the law and recite the law as
requiring discrimination "based on... sex."' 164 That is what the Lyle
court did.165  It is the same slight of hand performed by scholars who
argue that sexual speech subordinates, or that all sex speech is harassing
per se. 16 6 "Based on" implies an inquiry into the harassers' means, not
their motive. In the Lyle case, the writers arguably harassed her "based
on" her sex. Their give-and-take during the meetings could not have
been more sexual and demeaning. 167  But they did not harass her
"because of' her sex-in other words, because she was a woman. 168 The
difference between means and motive matters.169
Though the Court of Appeal never said so, it treated Lyle's claim as
describing an unintended hostile environment. 7 ° That describes a
disparate impact, not disparate treatment, case. 17 1  Even the writers'
defense-that "creative necessity" justified their vulgarity during the
meetings-172 is analogous to the 'business necessity' defense recognized
in disparate impact cases."' 173 As the Court of Appeal noted, the writers
miss the target if they argue they targeted Lyle for reasons other than her
163. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
164. Compare Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (Scalia, J., writing for the Court) ("The
prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in
the workplace."); with Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I concur
because the Court stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead
and ultimately prove Title VI's statutory requirement that there be discrimination
'because of... sex."'). Some scholars mischaracterize the law, too. See Franke, supra
note 15, at 772 (urging renewed attention "to the 'based on sex' element of the plaintiff's
case").
165. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 515 (seeking to "further clarify the 'based on sex'
element of a harassment cause of action").
166. See Franke, supra note 15 at 1784; see also Schwartz, supra note 15, at 772.
167. See supra notes 133-141 and accompanying text.
168. Based on Lyle's reported evidence, there is no reason to believe that the writers
would have acted any differently in the meetings had Lyle been a man. See generally
Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511.
169. See Oncale, 523 U.S at 80 (rejecting Doe's "suggest[ion] that workplace
harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser's...
motivations" by saying that "[w]e have never held that workplace harassment. . . is
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual
content or connotations").
170. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 515 ("Because the FEHA, like Title VII, is not a
fault based tort scheme, unlawful sexual harassment can occur even when the harassers
do not realize the offensive nature of their conduct or intend to harass the victim.").
171. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("Under [Title VII],
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices.").
172. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 518.
173. Id. at 520.
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sex-such as "for purely personal gratification or out of meanness or
bigotry or other personal motives."' 174 Those defenses would be relevant
if she was claiming intentional discrimination motivated by her sex. In a
disparate impact case, motive does not matter.
175
Lyle is noteworthy for two reasons. The first is that it so openly
embraces disparate impact theory in a sexual harassment case. 176 The
second is that Lyle worked in the white-collar, professional world
(writing, after all, is a profession). Indeed, the facts may serve to
disprove the theory that blue-collar work environments (like
construction) are inherently more vulgar than white-collar ones.
17 7
Rather than underscoring a difference between professional and non-
professional work environments, Lyle may in fact underscore the
difference between men and women. Men, in fact, simply may be more
vulgar and profane than women. 178 In all-male work environments, men
often use sexual profanity as a means of emasculating each other.179 In
other words, sexuality is the language of insult. 80 It is hard (though not
impossible) to imagine that women in all-female working environments
are as profane. (We may never know as there are so few of them.)
Though the evidence is anecdotal, the difference in the way men
and women use language is hard to ignore. The legal consequence is
also significant. If women are less likely than men to use profanity in the
174. Id.
175. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988) ("In
certain cases, facially neutral employment practices that have significant adverse effects
on protected groups have been held to violate the Act without proof that the employer
adopted those practices with a discriminatory intent.").
176. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 514-15.
177. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing
that plaintiff's claim of harassment must be evaluated in the context of his all-male, blue-
collar work environment, because "unfortunately, expressions such as 'fluck me,' 'kiss
my ass,' and 'suck my dick,' are commonplace in certain circles"); Gross v. Burggraf
Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537-38 (10th Cir. 1995) (evaluating plaintiff's harassment
claim in the context of his "real world of construction work," where "profanity and
vulgarity are not perceived as hostile or abusive," as opposed to "a prep school faculty
meeting or on the floor of Congress").
178. See Johnson, 125 F.3d at 412 (concluding that, more often than not, some vulgar
and profane expressions are not uttered because of sex "particularly when uttered by men
speaking to other men").
179. See id.; compare Franke, supra note 15, at 759 ("Workplace sexual conduct my
injure women because it objectifies them as sex objects, and it may injure men because it
assumes that all men conform to and join into a kind of sexualized hetero-masculine
culture.").
180. Perhaps it is a generational problem, too. See Galloway v. General Motors Serv.
Parts Opers., 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996) ("some heterosexual male teenagers
have taken recently to calling each other 'bitch'). Children are becoming sexualized at
an earlier age. See Gary W. Harper, Contextual Factors That Perpetuate Statutory Rape:
The Influence of Gender Roles, Sexual Socialization, and Sociocultural Factors, 50
DEPAUL L. REv. 897, 913 (2001).
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workplace (at least for the reason that they do not choose to use it as the
language of insult), is it such a stretch to say that they are also more
likely to be offended by it when they witness it? Or is that conclusion
the very sexist paternalism that offended Judge Williams (a woman) in
the case of Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions.'81 Lisa Ocheltree is a
woman who, like Amaani Lyle and unlike Diane Leibovitz, worked
inside a profane and sexually vulgar work environment. 182  Scollon
Productions hired Ocheltree to help make game mascots in South
Carolina. 183 Ocheltree's all-male coworkers regularly used vulgar and
profane language and told sexually-oriented jokes. 184 They mimicked
having sex with mannequins; on occasion she witnessed the simulated
sex acts.185 The men talked about having sex with their wives and
girlfriends and described whether their partners "gave good head,"
"swallowed," or "liked it from behind."' 86 They sang songs with verses
such as "come to me, come to me, your breath smells like cum to me,"
and showed her a picture of a man with pierced genitalia. 187 Even her
supervisor contributed to the vulgarity. The supervisor displayed a
photograph of a nude woman and engaged in severally sexually explicit
conversations with Ocheltree's coworkers. 188 He once stated that he
enjoyed having sex with young boys.
189
Ocheltree won her case before a jury, which awarded her $400,000
in punitive damages.' 90 Scollon appealed. What troubled the original
panel on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (in an
opinion authored by Judge Williams) was the evidence missing from
Ocheltree's case-evidence that Ocheltree's coworkers engaged in such
profanity because she was a woman.' 91 For the most part the point of the
harassment appeared to be to witness her reaction. 192 Other evidence
suggested that the environment pre-dated her arrival as the first woman
in the shop 93 and that it affected men who worked there, too.
194
181. Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 354.
182. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 328-29.
183. Id,
184. Id. at 328-29.
185. Id. at 328.
186. Id. at 329.
187. Id. at 328.
188. This fact comes from the original panel's opinion in Ocheltree I. Ocheltree v.
Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir.
2003) (en banc).
189. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 329.
190. Id. at 330.
191. See Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 359.
192. Id. at 358-59.
193. Id. at 357 ("[T]he uncontested evidence demonstrated that the men's behavior
did not begin or change as of the date Ocheltree began working with Scollon Productions
[Vol. 110:1
THE COMING RISE OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Ocheltree's working environment may have deteriorated a bit during her
employment, but that only returned the court to the familiar causation
issue: did the environment worsen because she was a woman (i.e.,
"because of sex") or because she had complained? 195 In a 2-1 decision,
the United States Court of Appeals concluded that Ocheltree's working
conditions, however profane, simply could not be tied to her sex.'
96
Judge Michael's dissent argued that Ocheltree needed no evidence
of causation to win her claim. 197  There was no doubt that the
environment affected her greatly-and differently-than the men who
worked there. For Judge Michael, the lopsided effect of the sexuality
mattered more than exactly why or when it started. 198 "[A] workplace
environment could be abusive 'because of a plaintiffs sex even if the
environment was essentially the same before and after the plaintiff
entered the workplace."' 199 Perhaps, but only under disparate impact
theory, and with proof that the workplace conditions were, in fact,
"disproportionately more offensive and demeaning to one sex.,
200
Shifting the focus from a harasser's intent to the harassment's impact
(here, on women) would altogether relieve a plaintiff from establishing
the motivation behind her treatment. Nevertheless, the dissent (citing
scholars who curiously have charted the same awkward path) 201 chose to
force the square peg (Ocheltree's evidence of a disparate impact) into the
round hole (her claim of disparate treatment). According to the dissent,
discussions of oral sex subordinate women to men, thereby satisfying the
statute's requirement that a successful plaintiff be treated differently
"because of' her sex.202 The awkwardness did not bother Judge Michael,
who read Title Vii's "because of' language as "allow[ing] for...
interpretive flexibility., 20 3  In other words, a statute that targets bad
motives does not have to mean what it says.
but had been ongoing before she came to work for Scollon Productions.").
194. Id. at 358 (noting that "Ocheltree conceded that the conduct was equally
offensive both to men and women" and that two of her coworkers "complained to
management about the other workers' behavior").
195. Id. at 359. The court noted that one coworker testified during the trial that the
men's behavior "worsened after Ocheltree complained." Id.
196. Id. ("[T]here is no evidence that those participating in the offensive conduct
were attempting to bother [Ocheltree] because of her gender.").
197. Id. at 372 (Michael, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 374.
200. Id. at 372.
201. See Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 366-80; see also Schwartz, supra note 15 at 1756-
74.
202. Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 375 (arguing that "pervasive workplace comments
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No matter. Ocheltree won her case when the Fourth Circuit reheard
it en banc. °4 Judge Michael wrote the decision of the nearly unanimous
court, though in his second take on the case he largely steered clear of
disparate impact theory.2 °5  Instead, he pointed to the incidents
surrounding Ocheltree and concluded that "a jury could reasonably find
that the men engaged in this conduct largely because they enjoyed
watching and laughing at the reactions of the only woman in the
shop. 20 6 In other words, they wanted to provoke her not because she
was new to the scene, but because she was a woman. Fair enough,
though Judge Williams, left alone this time to write the dissent, saw the
same facts very differently.207 For Judge Williams, the environment at
Scollon was rough for everybody-both men and women-and it
contained no overt hostility toward women.208 Tales of sexual exploits
are not abusive, she argued, and contemporary women are not so delicate
that they need a court's-indeed, a federal law's-protection:
In modem times, there is nothing particularly derogatory, demeaning,
or subservient about a woman participating in consensual
heterosexual sex. As women have sought and achieved sexual
equality in this society, and as moral beliefs and taboos about oral sex
have broken down, it seems illogical to assert that comments about
consensual sex between adults necessarily imply male dominance or
power.
20 9
Taken together, Leibovitz, Lyle, and Ocheltree tell us that Title VII,
though written forty years ago and in important respects unchanged since
that time, continues to evolve. Leibovitz is the easy case. Hers is not a
hostile environment that she experienced first-hand, or even witnessed,
but one that she heard about.210 One hopes that even scholars and courts
pushing for "interpretive flexibility" would rule out her claim. But even
in dismissing it, the Second Circuit allowed that it would be a different
case if Leibovitz had worked alongside the women she sought to help-
in other words, had she worked in an environment filled with innuendo
and profanity,21 as Amaani Lyle 212 or Lisa Ocheltree 213 did. Lyle and
204. See Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 325.
205. See id. at 331-36.
206. Id. at 332.
207. See id. at 337 (Williams, J., dissenting).
208. Ocheltree II, 335 F. 3d at 341-42.
209. Id. at 342.
210. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying notes.
211. See Leibovitz II, 252 F.3d at 190 (allowing that evidence of harassment directed
at co-workers may be relevant to an employee's own claim of hostile work environment
discrimination).
212. See supra notes 133-41.
213. See supra notes 185-90.
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Ocheltree suggest, if not prove, that the nature of the work has little to do
with the level of vulgarity women sometimes encounter.214 Lyle is the
easier case to classify. At best it must be an unintended hostile
environment case, grounded in disparate impact theory. After all, unlike
Ocheltree, Lyle had no evidence that her coworkers engaged in such
profanity in order to see how a woman would react.215 Ocheltree's case
straddles the divide between disparate treatment and disparate impact
theory, and after winning at trial, losing on appeal, and then finally
winning en banc (though even that victory was partial),21 6 the difficulties
posed by the case should come as no surprise. Judge Williams is correct
that many contemporary women are not offended by discussions laced
with sexuality.21 7 And, unlike racial epithets or the use of the term
"nigger" by African-Americans around other black workers who take
offense,21 8 the words describing sexual exploits and sex itself may not be
objectively demeaning to anyone. But for many, sex remains a private
matter, and sexuality a deeply personal issue, and if women are, in fact,
more offended than men when workplaces debase both sex and sexuality,
then that may be the kind of gender difference the law proscribes and
Ocheltree and Lyle the kind of women the law protects.
The answer given by the Supreme Court is that context matters,21 9
and that workplace conduct should not be measured in isolation, apart
from its surrounding circumstances, expectations, relationships, and
setting. The coach's pat on the player's buttocks is not abusive, though a
similar pat given to the coach's secretary would be.22° Without more, the
Court instructed judges and juries to be reasonable in these cases and to
allow that "social context" is the key.221 Again, Leibovitz is the easy
case. Her injury was purely vicarious.222 Lyle's writers claim that, in the
context of their work, their profanity and sexuality should have been
expected by Lyle and should be excused.223 On remand, a jury may well
agree. Ocheltree's coworkers and supervisors would have a tougher time
214. After all, Lyle worked in a professional environment while Ocheltree worked in
the blue-collar world.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 133-41.
216. The victory was partial because the court set aside the jury's punitive damages
award. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 336.
217. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1795 (1998) (citing research suggesting that "where men and women work alongside
each other in balanced numbers... sexual talk and joking occurs with frequency, but is
not experienced as harassment").
218. See Adler, supra note 127.
219. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
220. See id. at 81.
221. Id. at 82.
222. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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making the same case. In context, Ocheltree's work environment was
blue-collar and rough, and while there is support for men using sexuality
to emasculate each other,224 Lyle suggests that the nature of the work has
little to do with it. Indeed, the social context of Lyle and Ocheltree may
well work in their favor in one important way: they worked alone, as the
only women, in their environments. It would be fair to count that in their
favor. Harassment in the same-sex workplace is unlikely (though not
impossible) in part because same-sex attraction and hostility is unusual
and the men have little to gain by subordinating their own sex.225
Introducing a woman into an all-male environment raises the possibility
that some men will use sexual profanity to exclude them 226 and that some
women will be more threatened (and therefore affected) because they are
(literally) so one-sidedly outnumbered.
Whether the lawyers for Lyle and Leibovitz-and similarly situated
plaintiffs in the future-can make the disparate impact argument on their
behalf is not just a function of the law. It is also a function of their
advocacy. DeClue's lawyers missed the clear disparate impact caused by
not having a toilet for a female linesman to use.227 For good or bad, men
are simply more comfortable relieving themselves in public. (As a
matter of fact, it is easier for them to do it, too.) 228 If DeClue can make a
disparate impact argument in her case, then at least in theory, Ocheltree
and Lyle can make it in theirs. All three cases allege sex discrimination
involving their workplace conditions. The fact that DeClue's conditions
are unsanitary and Ocheltree's and Lyle's are overly-sexual hardly seems
to distinguish the cases in any important way.
The advantage to the unintended hostile environment (disparate
impact) claim is that it relies on the text of the statute Congress wrote. In
other words, it does not call for "interpretive flexibility" when reading
statutory terms. For courts, the hard part may well be deciding whether a
law which seeks to level the workplace playing field between men and
women is large enough to allow that differences still exist, most notably
in the way that the sexes react to sexual profanity and vulgarity. The
danger for paternalism (suggested by Judge Williams in her Ocheltree
224. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
225. Cf Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 548, 593 (2001) (studying reported federal court cases involving
sexual harassment and finding that male victims comprised less than 6% of the cases).
226. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2154
(2003) (citing social science research indicating that sexual and sexist jokes, and other
"insider humor" shared by men, are harmful not because of their sexuality but because
they relegate women to outsider status).
227. See DeClue, 223 F.3d at 437.
228. See id. at 438 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[i]f men are less reluctant to
urinate outdoors, it is in significant part because they need only unzip and take aim").
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dissent)229 has always existed and is not made worse by the disparate
impact claim. The sexual harassment claim recognizes that some
workplace conditions can be discriminatorily altered, in the typical case
by speech, and that working conditions are as important as terms of
employment, compensation, hirings, firings, and the like. Having to
work for an employer tolerant of those conditions would seem to be as
meaningful (in a negative sense) to the goal of equal opportunity as an
employer's overt decision to discriminate on the basis of sex. But
"tolerance" can mean many things, only one of them being awareness.
As discussed in Part IV, courts also will struggle in settling upon the
right rule for liability in unintended hostile environment cases.
IV. Deliberate Indifference: It's About Incentives
Identifying and demonstrating the disparate impact hostile
environment claim may be the easy part. Settling upon a standard of
liability in which employers would be liable for the claim is a more
delicate issue. The standard of liability in disparate impact cases is not
often contested. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has-to a
degree---disfavored strict liability in sexual harassment cases,23° an
employer's liability in a disparate impact case is, in fact, nearly
automatic.23' Of course, the damages available to a plaintiff are limited
by the terms of the statute, which allow only for injunctive relief (and
attorneys' fees) in disparate impact cases.232 In a hiring case, that means
the employer might be ordered to stop its discriminatory practices and
reconsider the applicants previously denied consideration.
But the disparate impact hostile environment claim appears to be a
different animal. It is not a typical disparate impact claim because it
relates to an employee's working conditions and her (in the typical case)
treatment. It may well result from a workplace culture that has evolved
over years, and, accordingly, cannot be eradicated overnight. That
characteristic alone distinguishes it from a hiring policy or weight-lifting
requirement that can be shredded by management fiat. Imposing strict
liability in the case of a hiring policy is offset by the relatively simple
task of reviewing job postings and interview questions to make sure they
do not unintentionally cause harm. A similarly unforgiving standard of
liability in a sexual harassment case (grounded in disparate impact
229. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
230. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (holding that Title VII does not make employers
"always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors").
231. Liability follows unless the employer can establish that its challenged practice is
"job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000).
232. See § 1981a(a)(l).
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theory) would place well-intentioned employers at the mercy of
employees they cannot constantly supervise and workplaces they cannot
wholly sanitize. In other words, it is not a fair balance.
Strict liability in the case of Lyle or even Ocheltree (if their claims
were disparate impact ones) may also be impossible after the Supreme
Court's decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton233 and Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth.234 The Supreme Court did not address coworker
harassment in those cases, but imposed strict liability in hostile
environment cases caused by supervisors only when the harassment was
coupled with a tangible job action, such as a threat of a firing tied to the
performance of a sexual act or sexual favor.235 According to the Court,
the Restatement (Second) of Agency could be dusted off to provide the
basis of liability in what has come to be known as the "aided by the
agency relation" standard.236 In other words, because the employer
placed the supervisor in a special position of power and authority, it
facilitated the accomplishment of the bad acts (such as sexual
harassment) that followed.237  Like the telegraph company whose
operator is sending false and injurious messages by wire, 238 the
supervisor's employer is liable not because it is morally culpable, but
because its supervisors are its agents and, at the moment of the bad act,
indistinguishable from the employer itself. The recipient of the telegram
is in no position to know that it is a hoax. Similarly, the employee is in
no position to draw a distinction between the supervisor who wields his
authority in corrupt ways and the employer who hired him. They are one
in the same.
The Supreme Court's "aided by the agency relation" is hardly the
type of clean craftsmanship that could be credited with bringing
simplicity and predictability to employment law. (It is scarcely more
"manageable" than the confusing legal landscape the Court set out to
233. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
234. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
235. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (adopting the rule that an employer is
vicariously liable for supervisory sexual harassment that is accompanied by a tangible job
action, but may raise an affirmative defense in other cases); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765
(articulating the same standard).
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958) .(noting that
generally a master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment but could be liable if the servant "was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation"). See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792
(noting that Meritor cited the RESTATEMENT "with general approval").
237. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 (agreeing with Faragher that "it makes sense to
hold an employer vicariously liable for some tortious conduct of a supervisor made
possible by abuse of his supervisory authority").
238. See RESTATEMENT, § 219(2) cmt. e.
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fix.) 239 In Meritor, the Supreme Court referred judges to common law
agency law principles to resolve the thorny issue of liability. 240 Not even
academics long on both time and space (as in law review pages) read as
much complexity into that reference as the Supreme Court did twelve
years later in Ellerth and Faragher. If the Restatement (Second). of
Agency, written in 1958, was capable of providing so little clarity to the
typical harassment case, then it is a wonder why the Supreme Court felt
constrained to use it. Common law agency principles, after all, are not
codified. So Ellerth and Faragher are, at the very least, lost
opportunities. The law that emerged from these twin cases is little more
navigable than the maddening circuit split241 that begat them.
Seven years later, it is water under the bridge. The Supreme Court
is unlikely to abandon stare decisis and formulate a more coherent
standard.242 And, truth be told, the Court got one thing right: the
standard of liability in sexual harassment (indeed, in discrimination)
cases must serve a purpose. The purpose the Court chose is one of
deterrence.243 Employers understand that strict liability is a risk when it
comes to supervisors who have authority to hire, fire, demote, and so
on.244 The result is an incentive to monitor and review those decisions to
ensure that they are bona fide.245  Providing employers with an
affirmative defense 246 in cases of supervisors who create hostile work
environments (harassing in that case just like coworkers do) gives those
same employers an incentive to publish strong anti-harassment policies
and grievance mechanisms. 247 Many include harassment training. 248 For
these employers, the upside is two-fold. These efforts make the defense
both available and, hopefully, unnecessary.
There is nothing wrong with law-makers keeping in mind the
incentives their laws create. (Regrettably, courts have become frequent
239. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785.
240. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
241. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785 (citing the Courts of Appeals' "different
approaches" on the employer liability issue).
242. See id. at 804 n.4 (determining that stare decisis commanded it to follow
Meritor, but also drawing meaning from Congress' "decision" to leave Meritor intact
after enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
243. Id. at 805-06 (noting that while Title VII seeks to make injured individuals
whole, its "primary objective ... is not to provide redress but to avoid harm").
244. Cf Juliano & Schwab, supra note 225, at 593 (reporting that 80% of the cases in
their study involved supervisory harassment at least in part).
245. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (finding it important in establishing a standard of
employer liability that employers have the "opportunity and incentive to screen [their
supervisors], train them, and monitor their performance").
246. Id. at 807-08.
247. See id.
248. See Schultz, supra note 226, at 2090-2100 (describing corporations' anti-
harassment efforts).
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law-makers in the area of employment law.) 24 9 That said, some courts
retain an almost Dickensian view of employers when it comes to
predicting how they will react to new law. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held on to that image in deciding
that a constructive discharge is a tangible job action such that employers
who leave victims of harassment no recourse but to resign their
employment are strictly liable. 250  The court worried that any other
holding would tempt employers to wait until harassed employees
resigned.251 After all, a resignation preserves the employer's affirmative
defense in these cases. A firing triggers strict liability. The court
concluded that when faced with a hostile environment, the temptation
would be too great for an employer to do nothing and to root for a
resignation.252 Some employers "might even tacitly approve of increased
harassment to achieve that result.,
253
More likely is a result that flows from this reality: business is
unlikely to stomach a long winter of harassment (and low productivity)
simply to make a legal case marginally more winnable in the spring.
That said, the Third Circuit was correct to think about incentives, and, on
its face, there is something to be said for the court's conclusion. In terms
of injuries, there is little difference between an employee fired for not
having sex with a supervisor (an obvious strict liability case) and another
employee not fired but compelled to resign rather than continue to work
in hell. Applying the same strict liability standard to both cases makes
sense so long as the second employee's working conditions are truly
hellish (not merely hostile).254 And, in truth, it is unlikely that forfeiting
the affirmative defense in that case costs the employer much. Employers
with hellish workplaces are unlikely to benefit from an affirmative
defense that rewards effective anti-harassment mechanisms.
So what incentives should be created in fashioning a standard of
liability in disparate impact hostile environment cases? The same ones
that the Supreme Court considered in Ellerth and Faragher: an
employer's incentive to watch the workplace and to remedy harassment
at the earliest possible moment. 255  But employers are only half the
249. Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997).
250. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2357 (2004) (rejecting
strict liability).
251. Suders, 325 F.3d at 461.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. "The workplace that is actionable is the one that is 'hellish."' Perry v. Harris
Chemin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997).
255. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (discussing standards of liability in the context of
creating incentives for employers and "giv[ing] credit here to employers who make
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equation, and employees are capable of helping themselves, too. Indeed,
in the language of torts, they often have the last, best chance to avoid the
harm altogether by complaining about it.25 6 They do neither themselves
nor their employers any favors when keeping silent about harassment,
especially incidents that are not open and obvious. That describes truly
threatening episodes that are undetectable by employers.257
One standard of liability is consistent with these incentives: a
standard of deliberate indifference. An employer should be liable for an
unintended hostile environment causing a provable disparate impact on a
protected group if it was both aware of the environment and willfully
indifferent to it. Proof of awareness could come in many forms, such
as-in the best case-an employee who has complained about the
environment to responsible parties (such as supervisors). But the
employer who is aware of the hostility for any other reason-perhaps by
observing it or because a third party has complained-must choose either
involvement or indifference. Indifference equates to doing nothing, or
nearly nothing. A good faith attempt to stop the harassment (perhaps by
counseling the offenders) would disprove indifference, but transferring
an employee into the same plant where a coworker who had harassed her
was recently transferred describes doing nearly nothing.258 It describes
indifference.
The deliberate indifference standard is not unique to the area of
harassment law. The Supreme Court uses the same standard in
determining whether schools should be liable for student-on-student
sexual harassment.259  The principle provisions of Title IX, the law
governing educational opportunities and guaranteeing a non-
discriminatory school environment, reads differently than Title VII.
260
reasonable efforts" to deter harassment).
256. Id. at 807 (holding that no liability should be found against the employer "[i]f the
victim could have avoided harm"); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 ("As we have observed, Title
VII borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine, and the considerations
which animate that doctrine would also support the limitation of employer liability in
certain circumstances.") (internal citation omitted).
257. In an increasingly high-tech world, many incidents of harassment may be
undetectable by employers despite their keeping a look-out.
258. See Frazier v. Delco Elec. Corp., 263 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing
summary judgment against employee on her harassment claim in case where coworker
stalked and terrorized employee).
259. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) ("[schools]
may be liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual harassment");
see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (making
school districts liable for damages in cases where they are deliberately indifferent to
teacher-student harassment).
260. Compare Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), with Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1).
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But the denominators are common:26 1 both laws forbid sexual harassment
in environments where employers (or educators) sometimes have little
control. If anything, the deliberate indifference standard imposed on
schools is even more generous than the one contemplated here. The
school standard contemplates case of intentional harassment.262 In
intentional cases of co-worker harassment, most courts use a negligence
standard,263 though the Supreme Court has never ruled on its
appropriateness.
The negligence standard imposes liability even if the employer did
not actually know about the coworker-created hostile environment so
long as it should have known about it.264 Why complicate matters by
establishing a different standard-one of deliberate indifference-in
cases of coworker-created hostile environments proven by disparate
impact theory? Two considerations counsel against using the same
negligence standard. First, intentional and unintentional harassment are
not moral equivalents. Other laws recognize the difference between
voluntary and involuntary acts.265 In context, employees may even be
able to spot the difference between the two. The risk of an employer's
liability should track its moral culpability-hence, a more generous
(deliberate indifference standard) in the unintended hostile environment
case. It is worth noting that the same parallelism rules out a strict
liability standard. If employers are liable for intentional coworker
harassment only when they have acted negligently, then it is hard to
justify a less generous standard where the injurious treatment is
unintended.
The second argument against imposing liability on negligent
employers is more practical. Employers told that they are liable even
though they were not aware-but should have been aware-of
harassment, are compelled to police the workplace like hall monitors.
Employee privacy, already a scarce workplace commodity, would
become legally foolish. Employers would be well-counseled to review
electronic transmissions and everyday employee interactions. After all,
if an unintended hostile environment claim were grounded in emails
261. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (using Meritor and Oncale-Title VII opinions-to
inform the Court's decision in case at hand).
262. Id. at 643 (concluding that, in certain circumstances, deliberate indifference to
known acts of harassment amounts to an intentional violation of Title IX).
263. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that federal courts "uniformly judg[e]
employer liability for coworker harassment under a negligence standard").
264. See id; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on
Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2003) (employer is liable for co-worker
harassment if it "knows or should have known of the conduct").
265. Tort law certainly distinguishes between intentional and unintentional acts, as
does criminal law.
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distributed through a company server, then expect this argument from a
plaintiffs lawyer: a reasonable employer would be reading the emails,
too. Undoubtedly, some employers already monitor employee
2626
interactions. 6 Perhaps they expect to limit their liability or to root out
harassment before it ripens into a lawsuit. 267 Faragher and Ellerth-and,
indeed, Suders-remind us that the law is about creating incentives and
balancing interests. The negligence standard encourages employers to
balance an employee's interest in privacy with its own interest in
avoiding litigation. A rational employer will strike that balance in its
own favor.268 The deliberate indifference standard comes with no such
trade-off. Gone is the employer's incentive to invade workplace privacy.
It is replaced with the employee's incentive to complain on her (or his)
own behalf.
Ultimately, the deliberate indifference standard is a necessary,
limiting force on the unintended hostile environment claim. An
employer successfully sued under disparate impact theory for hostile
environment sexual harassment is not vicariously liable, and certainly not
liable unfairly. It is liable because its willful indifference to an
employee's working conditions in fact was a contributing force to those
injuries,2 69 no less so than the employer who allows employees to work
around exposed wires or other openly dangerous conditions. Doing
nothing despite full appreciation of a danger describes an employer either
strangely uninvolved or risk-loving-in other words, a defendant.
But the deliberate indifference standard is also a limiting force on
the unintended hostile environment claim. An employer who
investigates and responds to a hostile environment cannot be termed
indifferent to it even if the response fails and the hostility continues.
Indifference means taking no action at all, or at the very least engaging in
such a low-level response to a problem that no reasonable person would
distinguish it from being indifferent. Whether that describes the
employers of Diane Leibovitz, Amaani Lyle, or Lisa Ocheltree remains
to be seen.
266 See Frances E. Zollers & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Workplace Violence and Security:
Are There Lessons For Peacemaking? 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 470 (2003)
(noting that many employers "have decided to monitor the workplace to determine if
harassment is taking place").
267 See id. at 470-71 (suggesting that the fear of liability has caused employers to monitor
emails and other worker interactions).
261 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-801 (rejecting adoption of negligence standard in case
before the Court).
269 Cf Davis, 526 U.S. at 645 (clarifying that the deliberate indifference "must, at a
minimum, 'cause students to undergo' harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to
it").
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V. The Deliberate Indifference Standard Applied to Leibovitz, Lyle,
and Ocheltree
Once again Leibovitz presents the easy case. Leibovitz apparently
complained to numerous Transit Authority officials about the harassment
relayed to her.270 According to the district court, those officials did very
little.271 The court concluded that a jury easily could have determined
that the Transit Authority was "deliberately indifferent" to the sexually
harassing actions of its supervisors.272 Because the Court of Appeals
threw out Leibovitz's hostile environment claim, it had no chance to
comment upon the trial court's unusual "deliberate indifference"
standard (though the Authority raised the issue in its appellate briefs).
But in getting Leibovitz's underlying claim so wrong (harassment of
others not even observed by the plaintiff can hardly support a hostile
environment claim),273 it is possible the district court stumbled upon the
correct standard of liability to be used.
Even so, it is a stretch to say that the Transit Authority was
deliberately indifferent to Leibovitz's complaints. In its opinion, the
Second Circuit concluded that after her complaints "[a] lengthy
investigation ensued,, 274 though the court also allowed that Leibovitz
considered the investigation to have lacked energy.275 It might be more
accurate to say that Leibovitz was displeased with the results of the
Authority's investigation. Whatever the Transit Authority's ultimate
conclusion about the harassment charge, it can hardly be said that by
investigating it did nothing about the complaints, or nearly nothing (the
deliberate indifference standard).276 An employee like Leibovitz is not
entitled to the best investigation of her complaints, nor the type of
investigation that she would have mounted had she been in charge. The
law should require only a reasonable investigation, and reasonableness in
this context also should take into account that Leibovitz's complaints
were on behalf of others-in other words, second- or third-hand.
Amaani Lyle worked around sexual vulgarity for four months
before the Friends' producers fired her, ostensibly because she could not
270. Leibovitz I, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
271. Id. at 153-54.
272. Id. at 153.
273. "Such a characterization would open the door to limitless employer liability, and
allow a recovery by any employee made distraught by office gossip, rumor or innuendo."
Leibovitz II, 252 F.3d at 189-90.
274. Id. at 182.
275. Id.
276. According to the district court, the Transit Authority "did ultimately investigate
the complaints and reach internal determinations on their merits." Leibovitz I, 4 F. Supp.
2d at 147.
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277
keep up with their jokes by typing fast enough during their meetings.
The Court of Appeal decision reinstating her lawsuit reflects her frequent
complaints to the show's producers concerning the lack of black
characters on the sitcom. 278 But the court makes no mention that she
complained about the profanity during her meetings. Perhaps she
complained to the offending writers but the opinion does not reflect it.
Perhaps she complained to producers about the profanity at the same
time she complained about the lack of black characters, though if true
that would seem a curious omission by the Court of Appeal. Equally
likely is that in complaining about the lack of black characters, she did
not complain about the sexuality and vulgarity. That scenario would
doom any disparate impact claim under the deliberate indifference
standard, even if she could establish that the producers were generally
aware that the writers' sessions were fairly rough stuff. How so?
Because the standard of liability proposed here would require proof that
the employer was aware of the workplace conditions and the plaintiffs
injuries. Rough workplaces are not unlawful per se. They are only
unlawful-even under the disparate impact proof model-if they cause
injury, and an employer can hardly be called indifferent to injuries that
are unknown.
Awareness of injury further limits the unintended hostile
environment claim. The case filed by Dennis Vaughn illustrates the
limitation nicely.279 Vaughn worked as an oil rig roustabout on an
offshore rig off the Louisiana coast in the Gulf of Mexico. 280 The rig
belonged to Marathon Oil Company, but Vaughn worked for a different
company which provided crew complements on the rig.281 Roustabouts
such as Vaughn were at the bottom rung of employment ladder on oil
rigs.282 They mostly cleaned and painted the boats.283 They worked
seven days at a time in close and cramped quarters, which were rough, to
say the least.284 Within a month of beginning his job, he was hazed by
his coworkers. They stripped him and had his genitals covered with
grease.285 But his real complaint, which he made for the first time after
quitting his job, was the racially charged treatment he received.
According to Vaughn, his coworkers called him "nigger," "coon," and
277. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 513 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004), petition for review granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004).
278. Id.
279. See Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982).
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"black boy." 286 After one near-accident on the rig, a Marathon employee
called him racial epithets. 87 Marathon kept a toolshed on the rig which
had "KKK Headquarters" written across its facade.288 Finally, on the day
he resigned, the crew watched a news report that a black man had shot
several individuals in New Orleans. The crew laughed when one
coworkers exclaimed, "That's just like a nigger; give him a gun and he
shoots anything that moves. 289
Vaughn's case sounds strong, either as a disparate treatment claim
or a disparate impact one. He certainly thought so, as he sued his
employer for racial harassment under Title VII. But in truth he had
neither claim. Vaughn participated in the rough atmosphere and
apparently gave as good as he got from his coworkers. 290 Life on the rig
was unpleasant, but it was that way for everyone.2 9' And, importantly,
even Vaughn agreed at his deposition that the pranks and the hazing were
not race-motivated.292 He endured them just as new white workers did.
That fact was enough to doom most of his disparate treatment claim,
leaving the abusive, racist remarks used by his coworkers. In affirming
summary judgment for Vaughn's employer, the court of appeals quoted
its earlier decision in Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission:293 "A discriminatory and offensive work environment, 'so
heavily polluted with discrimination so as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers' in itself
may constitute a Title VII violations. 294  The court then found that
Vaughn's working environment did not satisfy this test; rather, he had
described "an atmosphere replete with instances of humiliating acts
shared by all. 295
The problem with Vaughn is that by focusing exclusively on the
effect Vaughn's workplace would have on "minority group workers," the
court has described a disparate impact, not disparate treatment, case. So
it should not be a surprise that, in addition to citing Rogers, the court also
cited the Supreme Court's famous disparate impact opinion in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 29 6 and then criticized the district court for focusing too
286. Id. at 924.
287. Id.
288. Id. at n.2.
289. Id. at 924.
290. See id. ("Vaughn used racial slurs along with his co-employees.").
291. Id. at 925 ("[N]early all rig employees were victims of the pranks at one time or
another").
292. Id. (testifying that "its just what they [his coworkers] did, you know").
293. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
294. Vaughn, 683 F.2d at 924.
295. Id.
296. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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much "on the intent of those who created [Vaughn's] environment. 297
Rogers, which "was apparently the first case to recognize a cause of
action based upon a discriminatory work environment, 298 also heavily
relied on Griggs and disparate impact theory. 299 Both the Rogers and
Vaughn courts have obvious trouble distinguishing between disparate
treatment and disparate impact proof models. Hostile work
environments are only unlawful under disparate treatment theory
(Vaughn's theory) if the plaintiff has evidence of bad intent (such as
racial animus). Vaughn lacked that evidence.
Still, despite doing so unwittingly, Vaughn remains one of the first
cases to allow a plaintiff to prove an actionable hostile environment
through disparate impact proof. That may be a historical footnote, and it
fails to help Vaughn where it counts. Like Lyle, Vaughn never claimed
to be injured by his environment and rough, racially-charged
workplaces--especially all-male ones300-are not necessarily unlawful.
They are unlawful under the deliberate indifference standard described
here if they are severe enough to injure a protected class or its
representative (Vaughn) and the injury is unmistakable. Not even when
resigning did Vaughn complain about his working conditions, 30 1 making
it possible (if not likely) that his employer concluded they affected him
little. It may not matter. Vaughn's supervisor stuck up for him on at
least two important occasions,30 2 demonstrating how difficult it would
(and should) be for disparate impact plaintiffs to establish true
indifference.
Once again, Ocheltree30 3 presents the case with the chance to test
the limits of the deliberate indifference theory. Assume for the moment
that Ocheltree's real claim is, as the dissent in Ocheltree I argued, one
grounded in disparate impact-not disparate treatment-theory. Under
the test set out here, her employer would be liable only if it was both
aware of Ocheltree's working conditions and indifferent to it. Ocheltree
tried to complain several times to Bill Scollon, the company president,
and Ellery Locklear, its vice president. 304 But several forces worked
against her. First, the company had no real anti-harassment policy,
though the company handbook did forbid "verbal abuse" in a section
297. Vaughn, 683 F.2d at 925 n.3.
298. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
299. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238-39.
300. It is fair to take the single-sex makeup into account because Oncale directs
courts to consider the plaintiff's "social context" in these cases. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
301. Vaughn, 683 F.2d at 924.
302. See id. (describing incidents in which the toolpusher supported Vaughn).
303. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d 325.
304. See id. at 329-30.
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entitled "Talking. 3 °5  Second, the handbook's "open door policy"
concerning employee complaints directed employees to seek out their
immediate supervisors to resolve any problems.3 °6 Only problems not
resolved by supervisors could be directed to Scollon or Locklear.3 °7
Complaining to one's supervisor makes sense, except in Ocheltree's
case, where her supervisor was a full participant in the rough working
environment. The company's "open door policy" did not instruct an
employee like Ocheltree what to do in that case. Setting aside the
company's ineffective policies, Ocheltree did try to contact Scollon and
Locklear. She visited Scollon in her office several times but in each
instance he waved her off and directed her to see Locklear 308 She did
just that and even passed Locklear a note that she needed to speak to him
about something "very important." 309  She underlined those words.
Locklear did nothing. 310 But her supervisor did. He made a routine out
of following her to the bathroom whenever he suspected that she was
about to go over his head with her complaints.31 When she emerged
from the bathroom, he would tell her to go back to work.31 2
When an employee makes a hostile environment claim grounded in
disparate impact theory (little of Ocheltree's evidence showed treatment
motivated by her sex), the deliberate indifference standard would apply.
While that standard requires actual knowledge of the offensive working
conditions, a "see no evil, hear no evil" strategy changes the
calculation.31 3 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Ocheltree's employer
should be liable because it acted negligently in establishing woefully
poor avenues of complaint.314 Scollon Productions should have known
about the harassment, the court argued, and should be charged with
constructive knowledge of the conditions.31 5 Constructive knowledge
describes what Scollon possessed, but finding only negligence in the
company's conduct is too generous. Where an employee does, in fact,
attempt to complain on numerous occasions, but is not given an audience
by company officials (or, in Ocheltree's case, is turned away), the
company can be imputed with the information it would have learned had
it listened. This result is only underscored when one of the company's








313. Id. at 334.
314. Id. at 334-35.
315. Id. at 335.
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own supervisors (its agent for Title VII purposes) aggressively
obstructed and interfered with the employee's ability to complain. In
lying in wait outside the woman's restroom, Ocheltree's supervisor did
exactly that. The sum total of these activities describe affirmative
conduct on Scollon's part. In other words, it describes deliberateness,
not negligence.
That said, neither deliberateness nor indifference should be found
simply because a company's anti-harassment mechanisms are poor, or
even non-existent. These days most, if not all, employees understand
that coworkers or supervisors do not have the authority (or legal right) to
harass them. It is hard to imagine that they have to be told they can
complain, or that they complain to upper-level company officials only
because a company handbook allows them to. The lack of reasonable
anti-harassment mechanisms should matter in a disparate treatment case
(where the standard is, in fact, negligence). But in the general disparate
impact hostile environment case, poor policies should not be used to
justify an employee's decision not to complain, and the fact that policies
are altogether missing should not invite a court to find constructive
knowledge of workplace harassment.316 Lisa Ocheltree's case is special
because she did complain, or at least attempted to, but her efforts were
either thwarted or ignored.317
VI. Conclusion
In truth, the disparate impact hostile environment claim is special,
too. It stands at the intersection of the law that Congress wrote and the
way that some scholars and judges would like the law of disparate
treatment discrimination to be. Congress protected employees from
discrimination "because of' their sex (among other characteristics), and
the Supreme Court has correctly-and consistently--determined that
these are words of intent. In the cases described in this article,318 that
means the plaintiff must at the very least point to evidence that the
"harassers" intended to treat her differently because of her sex. They
need not intend that the harassment cause injury (they receive no
advantage if they prove to be unrefined or simply obtuse), but their
motive must be tied to a protected class they have set out to demean or
otherwise treat differently.
The textualist approach-reading the words Congress wrote and
316. But see Lyle v. ESPN Zone, 292 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (D.Md. 2003) (finding
that a "dysfunctional" anti-harassment policy justifies imputing constructive notice of
harassment to employer) (citing Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 334).
317. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
318. See supra Parts III-IV.
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giving them their plain meaning-comes with the advantage that it
respects the role traditionally given to the judiciary. That some courts
and scholars would approach those words ("because of") with
"interpretive flexibility," 319 should be no source of pride. Some scholars
even openly concede that they would approach all sex speech in the
workplace as necessarily motivated by gender or, at the very least,
contributing to sexist norms and a general "heteropatriarchy. '32 Statutes
are not like rubber bands. They are not meant to be stretched in all
directions so as to satisfy the personal preferences of either law-makers
or legal commentators. Their necessary tautness rules out more plaintiffs
than it rules in, as Dennis Vaughn (ruled out) and even Lisa Ocheltree
(ruled out by two courts before ruled in by a third) can attest.
Rather than stretching the law, disparate impact theory reflects it.
Courts allowed for the theory before Congress did, but legislators
embraced the theory and wrote it into the law when they amended the
Civil Rights Act in 1991.321 Disparate impact theory has always
provided a legitimate legal claim in sex discrimination law. An
employer's senseless requirement that its employees lift a minimum
quantum of weight is only one example. And courts have always
approached sexual harassment as a form, or subset, of sex discrimination.
What is good for the goose is good for the gander. If disparate impact
theory works in sex discrimination cases in general, then it must work in
sexual harassment cases in particular.
This is not to say that the disparate impact hostile environment
claim would be a picnic to prove. The plaintiff would have to point to
treatment that, while not prompted by animus, polluted the workplace
and affected her greatly because of her sex. Her reaction would have to
be reasonable and would have to represent the reaction a jury could
reasonably expect from any member of her class (that is, the same
reaction other women would give). At that point she would be only half-
way home. The burden would also be hers to prove that after learning of
her injury, her employer was deliberately indifferent to it. The deliberate
indifference standard is necessary to rein in a legal claim that must strike
the right balance between the incentives the law wants to provide
(encouraging employers to rid their workplaces from pernicious working
conditions) and the ones it wants to avoid (encouraging employees to sue
for less-than-hellish working conditions).322 And if she can do all of this,
the reality is there is no payday awaiting her. Congress provided only for
319. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
320. See Schwartz and Franke, supra note 15.
321. See supra Part I.
322. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805 (rejecting one formula for employer liability
because "the temptation to litigate would be hard to resist").
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equitable relief in successful disparate impact cases, meaning she might
get an injunctive remedy and her attorneys' fees, but no money damages.
Diane Leibovitz did not suffer an unintended hostile environment.
Actually, she sued on behalf of others, ruling out both a disparate
treatment and disparate impact claim. Amanni Lyle's workplace may
have been hostile but not sex-based. Even the California Court of
Appeal used the language of disparate impact theory (ruling out a
requirement that the plaintiff be a "direct victim" of harassment) to
resurrect the claim the district court dismissed. But whether she
complained to the Friends' producers about the harassment is less clear.
One thing is certain: her complaints about the lack of black characters on
the show has nothing to do with her working conditions and, thus, would
hardly mean much under the "deliberate indifference" standard. And
Dennis Vaughn? He never claimed to have been injured by the rough
language (and epithets) used around him. Again, the Court of Appeals
used disparate impact language (even citing disparate impact cases)
before concluding that Vaughn did not appear very affected by the
conditions surrounding him.
Based on the fullness of the record, Lisa Ocheltree's treatment was
more sexual than sex-based. That should have ruled out a disparate
treatment claim. But instead of approaching her environment as
unintendedly hostile, the Court of Appeals (en banc) salvaged her
intentional discrimination claim. The court's decision was a lost
opportunity because it sent a message that "because of sex" means less
than it says. Indeed, taken together (and chronologically), Vaughn,
Leibovitz, Ocheltree, and Lyle send the message that disparate impact
theory-and case law-can support an employee's intentional sexual
harassment claim. They cannot.323
One day a true disparate impact claim will be brought in a sexual
harassment case. Under the right circumstances (and a deliberate
indifference standard),324 it may even be won. In that case the claim
could be criticized fairly for many reasons, one of them that it
contributes to a perception that women must be protected from certain
kinds of speech.325 But the criticism cannot be that a court recognized a
novel new claim or invented new law. The victory in that case will lie in
old law and, as is often, good lawyers.
323. See supra Part III.
324. See supra Parts IV-V.
325. See Schultz, supra note 226, at 2163 ("We should ask ourselves: Is this really the
world we want to inhabit? Has feminism really nothing better to offer than an
impoverished vision of a workplace sanitized of all sexuality and passion, in the name of
protecting women?").
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